

miles of Slocum's advance. While at the bridge I had acquired from my scouts, who examined your columns closely, accurate information of your strength and movements, all of which was telegraphed to Gen. Hardee at Savannah.

But so possessed was he with the idea that my reports were exaggerated, and that you were making the best escape you could to the protection of the gunboats at Port Royal or Osaubaw, that my advice with regard to his action was not heeded. He was induced, however, to run up to me at the bridge, arriving Friday evening, but even there and at Tenille, where I had a consultation with him again, he could not comprehend the situation, so prejudiced had his mind become by telegrams from Gen. Bragg at Augusta.

At Millen I again halted until a courier from Gen. Wheeler advised me to fall back to the crossing of the Little Ogeechee, as Gen. Kilpatrick was working to get behind me.

At the Little Ogeechee I again took up position until your right wing lapped me, when I fell back. On receiving my telegram to that effect, Gen. Hardee peremptorily ordered me to return to my position at the Little Ogeechee, adding that he would send up 4,000 Confederate troops to my assistance.

I returned as ordered, although my officers, in a body, protested against it, resumed my abandoned lines, and was reinforced as promised. The troops were disposed to make the best fight against overwhelming odds that could be made, and I grimly awaited the result.

Your advance began skirmishing in the morning. In the course of the day Gen. McLaws arrived with orders from Gen. Hardee to relieve me in the command. I rode with McLaws along the lines, explaining my positions and the reasons for them, and the condition of affairs, and returning to the telegraph station on the line of the railroad, resigned the command and retired to sleep, of which I stood in need.

Hardly had I closed my eyes, when a request from Gen. McLaws took me again to the telegraph station. Taking me aside, he told me that he had come up under a total misconception of the state of affairs; that their true condition had not been represented to him, and that under the circumstances he would not take the command, and that I must get out of the scrape.

I told him that Gen. Hardee had my telegrams representing Sherman's force at over seventy thousand men, marching leisurely along; that I had got out of the scrape once, but was sent back with increased numbers to complicate the problem, and that I was truly glad to be relieved from such (in my opinion) unwise operations. He positively refused to continue in command, and immediately returned to Savannah.

WAYNE TRIES TO WITHDRAW.
Skirmishing in front was continuing, and from my advance line I observed your position and movements to flank my right, the river being fordable, about waist-deep, above. Keeping my own counsel, I waited until 11 o'clock at night, when I sent for the Generals of divisions and brigades, explained to them the position, and gave orders for withdrawing immediately and silently.

The orders were well executed, and by 2 a. m. I had extricated my men and was in retreat; the cavalry, with a battery of field-artillery, covering it. At daybreak I saw my anticipations realized. You had flanked me, ready to close upon my right wing and rear. Escaping from your troops, I found my retreat embarrassed by an unexpected and dangerous obstruction. Civilians had been sent out from Savannah to burn the bridges in your front, and had commenced by destroying them in my rear, instead of waiting for me to pass. This nearly cost me my artillery, which was only saved by the coolness and energy of the officer in command of it.

At about fifteen miles from Savannah my retreat was arrested by orders to take position behind a line of rifle-pits that had been dug there, and to occupy the line between the railroad and the Savannah River. Reconnoitering the position, I returned to my command and began my dispositions, when orders came to me to fall back upon the city, and occupy a line between the Augusta road and the river.

On arriving in Savannah I reported in person at Headquarters, and found there Gen. Beauregard, who had come over from Charleston. Making my report to him, in regard to your strength was included, he threw his hands up and exclaimed:

"What has come over you? You did not use to be so nervous! Gen. Bragg telegraphs me from Augusta that Sherman has not more than twenty-one thousand men with him, that he hardly has eighteen thousand muskets, and is making a hasty retreat for his gunboats, either across Sister's Ferry to Port Royal, or to Osaubaw."

I replied: "General, I don't know what reliable sources of information Gen. Bragg may have in Augusta, but Gen. Wheeler and I, who are the only general officers who have been in front of the enemy for the past 15 days, have both reported that Gen. Sherman has with him a force of more than seventy thousand men well organized and equipped, marching leisurely, and showing no signs of haste."

"He cannot cross the Savannah River at Sister's Ferry, as there is a freshet, and the South Carolina side is flooded for three miles and more beyond it. Believe me, that Savannah is his objective point, and that on Friday night he will invest the city."

My words seemed, unfortunately, to have no weight, and Gen. G. W. Smith, recovering from a slight attack of illness, I turned over to him the next day my

command, and awaited the inevitable result of your movements.

WAYNE'S APPREHENSIONS FULFILLED.
On Friday morning early, my cousin, Col. George Gordon, of the 60th Ga., temporarily attached to Headquarters, called upon me in much concern, for he was sincerely attached to me, and expressed great regret at the position I held in the public estimation, saying that scouts had gone 70 miles up the right bank of the Ogeechee without encountering a sign of an enemy, and that I must certainly be mistaken.

To which I answered that I was fully aware of the public feeling toward me, and was sorry for it, but that I was right and not mistaken, as events would show, and that, though unpleasant, I had to bear like a man present contentedly, knowing that I was right; and added:

"Mark my word! At 2 p. m. to-day some of Osterhaus's men will break up the little command of North Carolinians at No. 2, and at nine to-night Savannah will be surrounded. I hear that your uncle, Mr. Cuyler, the President of the Central Railroad, intends leaving by a special train this evening on the Gulf Railroad for Macon. Beg him, from me, not to attempt it, for if he does he will run into Sherman's lines." He went, however, and was captured.

Learning toward evening that Gen. Beauregard intended to return that night to Charleston by the railroad, I called upon him and urged him not to attempt it, but cross at Screven's Ferry, below Savannah, and take the road at Hardeeville. My advice, however, was rejected, and he left by rail. Fortunately, the conductor thought there might be some danger, and ran slowly, stopping his train within about a mile of Slocum's lines.

Gen. Beauregard returned to Savannah and crossed at Screven's Ferry. The next morning revealed to the incredulous that Savannah was invested. The capture of McAllister settled the doubts as to your objective completely.

The defense of Savannah should have been made, as I advised at the time, along the line of the Great Ogeechee. There you might have been checked, as my own slight resistance subsequently convinced me. That river passed, however, there was no serious impediment in your way to the sea. And had a strong fight been made there, I question if you could have made your way through the Carolinians unless reinforced strongly at Savannah.

At no time was Gen. Hardee in the field with 10,000 men, as you state on page 193, second volume. He was not in the field at all with any troops. And what you state on the same page with regard to McLaws at Ogeechee Church (the Little Ogeechee, I call it) I have already explained in this narrative.

In all the incidents of this little campaign, I owe whatever merit may attach to them largely to my Chief-of-Staff, Gen. Capers; and in resistance at the bridge and Ball's Ferry, to him, and to Maj. Alfred L. Hartridge, an élite of the Georgia Military Institute, in immediate command of the Confederate troops under me.

HENRY C. WAYNE.

HOW THE NEGROES REGARDED SHERMAN.

Gen. A. Baird wrote the following to Hon. Gerrit Smith, Peterboro, N. Y., from Savannah, Ga., in January, 1865:

MY DEAR SIR: You have heard, I know, of our occupation of this place, and many of the incidents connected with it must be familiar to you, but there is one which I wish you could have witnessed. I chanced on two or three consecutive days after our arrival to be in Gen. Sherman's rooms when he was receiving the negroes of the place. Poor creatures! they came to him as they delivered, and one black preacher told him, like Simeon in the Bible, he had prayed for this day, and all he now wanted was to see Mr. Lincoln. Some of them wanted to kneel before him, but the General would not permit it, and told them they must not kneel to any one but their Maker.

To the white rebels, particularly those in high official positions, swelling, as they are apt to do, with their own self-importance, Sherman is not conciliatory. He tells them plainly of their crime and of the penalties which they must expect, and his treatment is the same of those who attempt to shield themselves under the garb of foreign allegiance or foreign official position; but to these humble creatures, overflowing with gratitude to God and to him, he was a different person, all kindness and goodness. He detained them with him, and their simple talk seemed to give him a pleasure which I have not seen him display in his intercourse with those of more pretension.

While I was with him a negro recruiting officer came in to exhibit his papers. The General did not encourage him, and the other blacks present at once appealed to the General to know whether they were all liable to be conscripted and carried off, as armed parties were then circulating through the city, seizing every one they could, doubtless to speculate upon the bounties offered by the Government.

Gen. Sherman at once dispatched his staff officers to put a stop to this outrage, and told the negroes that they were now free, that they must look for their living, and that, if they chose to enter the army and fight they could do so, but should not be compelled to enlist or be treated otherwise than white men were; and that, so far as his feelings were concerned, he would rather for some time yet use them as laborers and pioneers than as soldiers.

You and I, who have been Abolitionists of the strictest school for so many years—I since 1834, and you longer—may be permitted to be critical respecting the faith of new converts, and I am

willing to take this display of Gen. Sherman's feelings before the louder professions of many others.

Previous to this interview with the blacks, which I witnessed, I had regarded Gen. Sherman as a pro-slavery man—for most of the men I meet are pro-slavery—but since then I have looked upon him as not simply a great man but a good man as well.

I wish you would let your friend Phillips, and others thinking as we do, know these facts, since a man having the ability to do so much good, and having his heart in the right direction, should have all possible encouragement and support.

Most affectionately yours,
A. BAIRD.

SHERMAN ON SLAVERY.

To this letter Mr. Smith made a prompt reply, expressing great gratification on his part and on that of Mr. Wendell Phillips, to whom he sent the letter, at this exhibition of Gen. Sherman's feelings. Gen. Baird forwarded Mr. Smith's reply to Gen. Sherman, and he promptly sent the following:

DEAR BAIRD: I thank you for the perusal of Gerrit Smith's letter. I doubt not he feels the joy he expresses at our progress, because we free the slaves in the same ratio that we manifest the power of our Government.

It seems impossible for citizens to understand us of the old Army. In our private circles we may be gentle, kind, and forbearing, but when mutiny and war show their horrid heads, we may seem very devils. As to the negro, I know I will do as much to ameliorate his political and social condition as Gerrit Smith, Wendell Phillips, Greeley, and others who seem to me mere theorists and not practical workers.

If the people of the South had stood by the Constitution, I for one would have fought for the protection of the slave property, just as much as for any other kind of property, because the Constitution was a contract, signed, sealed, and delivered, and we had no right to go behind it. The right or wrong of slavery in the abstract had nothing to do with the contract made by our forefathers, for reasons good enough for them, and which we were bound in honor and law to abide by.

But when the people and States of the South undertook to save their slave property by themselves breaking the Constitution, they themselves released us of our honorary and legal obligation, and we are free to deal with slavery as we please. They were slaves, but are now free, made so by their former owners breaking the bonds by which their slave property alone could be held.

Slavery as of old in this land is, in my judgment, long since determined, but we live in a busy world, and people won't be still. No sooner is one point gained than new ones arise, and we find plenty of people contending to make negroes voters, and even, with the legal right and encouragement, to commingle their blood with ours.

On these points I think men may honestly differ very widely, and I for one would be slow in going to such extremes. The negro should, of course, be protected in his industry and encouraged to acquire property, knowledge, trade, and every means possible to better his condition, but I think we should all be rather too slow than too fast in extending political rights. These in time will adjust themselves according to the laws of nature and experience.

"Festina lente" is a good old maxim, and we who have to catch the bulleting of political factions fighting their battles over our shoulders, ought to have a voice in questions which involve prejudices that influence the actions of men quite as much as pure reason.

I believe you and I have practically done more acts of kindness to the negroes of America than all the philanthropists put together; but our acts are quiet and unknown, whereas theirs have been noisy and demonstrative. I do not say this of Gerrit Smith, but of others who make the negro a hobby, and keep their precious persons well out of harm's way in the bloody struggle they have had their share in making, but not in subduing. Your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

(To be continued.)

EDITORIAL NOTE. The events of the closing years of Gen. Sherman's life, including his refusal to become a candidate for the Presidency, and the controversy over Jefferson Davis's change of position as to States Rights doctrine, will be related in the next instalment of "Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman."

Gen. Polk's Death.

H. Shannon, Duval, O., writes: "In a recent issue J. J. Pepper, Co. A, 16th Iowa, claims that Lieut. Crutcher is mistaken regarding the battery that killed Gen. Polk, and that it was Landgreber's battery, of Crocker's Iowa Brigade. I claim that it was the 5th Ind. battery, attached to the First Brigade, First Division, Fourth Corps, and the only battery that was firing on Pine Mount at the time Polk was killed. There were no rifle guns, as one writer claims. They were Napoleons, smooth bore 12-pounders. At the time of Polk's death the battery was throwing shot over our line, and wounded several men by the pieces of wood that were placed between the powder and ball in the cartridge, dropping in our line."

"We heard of Polk's death less than an hour after he was killed, through our signal corps. A member of the 5th Ind. battery claims they were armed with Rodman rifle guns. My recollection is that at the time of the reorganization of the Army of the Cumberland, after the battle of Chickamauga, the 5th Ind. was attached to our brigade, and they had Napoleons, smooth-bore 12-pounders."

TO CURE A COLD IN ONE DAY.

Take Laxative Bromo Quinine Tablets. All druggists refund the money if it fails to cure. 25c. The genuine has L. B. Q. on each tablet.

Lost.
[Washington Star.]
"Have you followed my argument so far," required the verbose friend.
"Yes," replied his impatient friend.
"But I tell you candidly, I'd quit its company right here if I thought I could find my way back."

FIGHTING THEM OVER

What the Veterans Have to Say About Their Campaigns.

(The Editor would be glad to receive from the veterans (Volunteers and Regulars) articles of from 500 to 1,000 words, written exclusively for THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, and for publication in the Fighting Them Over department. The subject should be of interest to veterans in general, and treated from a special regard for historical accuracy of statement. Narratives of the behavior of some part of your regiment, brigade, or division on some field where it distinguished itself, in some campaign in which it took a prominent part, in some siege wherein it acted offensively or defensively; reminiscences of prison life, the march, the battle or the death of such a one as you. The naval veterans are invited to give narratives of their service in various enterprises. The Editor especially desires for publication outside of the Fighting Them Over columns dramatic sketches of naval adventures, or of humorous incidents, connected with various services. Articles will receive prompt consideration, and if available, be inserted. States should be indicated if it is desired that the manuscript be returned if unavailable.)

GUNS AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Authoritative Statements of Gen. Mulholland and Corp'l Lebroke.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: I am always deeply interested in Pickett's Shots, and I enclose herewith a copy of a letter written by me, in relation to the guns at Chancellorsville. I was really surprised at the claim made by the Third Division, that the guns at Chancellorsville were in the hands of the First and Second Brigades, and a part of the regiment to which I was attached carried the wounded from the burning building. Knowing that Gen. St. Clair A. Mulholland, 116th Pa., now at Philadelphia, was an active participant in that affair, I wrote him a letter inclosing the clipping mentioned, and asked him for any positive information he could give me on the subject in controversy.

I enclose his letter in reply to mine, and other papers. Gen. Mulholland's letter reads: "It is strange that ever since the close of the war regiment after regiment has claimed the honor of saving this battery of which you speak. The battery was the 5th Me., commanded by Capt. Leppine, who was mortally wounded. I was personally assisted in sending him to the rear."

"I inclose an extract from my official report, and I also inclose a letter written by Corp'l Lebroke, one of the two members of the battery who remained with the guns until the last. I procured a Congress medal of honor for Lebroke shortly after the battle. You will see by his letter that the smoke of the fight had hardly cleared away until others, not in their claims, hence Lebroke's letter."

"Gen. Hancock in his official report of the battle states that the guns were left off by my regiment and men of the 14th Pa., etc."

"You are right in regard to the men of your regiment saving the wounded from the burning Chancellorsville House. I was an eyewitness to that gallant act."

"There were no other troops left in the vicinity of the burning building when I left with the guns of the battery. Capt. Garrett Nowlen (killed at Meigs Station) and myself were the last to leave, and not until the last gun of the battery had started down the road, and there was not a Union man, except the dead and wounded, remaining at us."

"The Confederates were in full possession of the ground on which the battery had been standing within two minutes from the time."

Following is the extract of report:

HEADQUARTERS 116TH PA.,

CAMP NEAR FALMOUTH, VA., May 7, 1863.

To CAPT. M. W. LILL.

A. A. G., Irish Brigade.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command at the battle of Chancellorsville.

"* * * Early on the morning of May 3 the firing began again. My regiment was under arms and calmly awaited the onset when the Irish Brigade would once more add new laurels to its already historic name, and we waited to see the order come."

"The brigade moved to a point near the Chancellorsville House, where it was formed in line by Gen. Meagher, with my regiment on the left, which rested at the edge of the woods, near the Chancellorsville House. During the movement the Confederates were in great numbers, killing and wounding many in the several regiments of the brigade."

"Shortly after our line was formed the 5th Me. battery, commanded by Capt. Leppine, came dashing up the road, and went into position on the left of my regiment and opened fire with their guns. The position of the battery was plainly visible."

"Capt. Leppine had no sooner commenced firing than three or four of the enemy's batteries concentrated their fire upon his guns, and with fearful effect, killing and wounding the men and horses with great rapidity."

"In less than an hour from the time the battery had gone into action every gun, with one exception, had been silenced, and but two men of the battery remained with that gun. At this moment Maj. Scott, of Gen. Hancock's staff, requested me to save the deserted guns, as they were in great danger of falling into the hands of the enemy. I detailed a sufficient number of men to haul the guns off the field, which they did under a heavy fire, and in the most gallant manner. Four of the guns were thus saved, and by my command, and another was taken off by some men of the 13th Pa., assisted by the men of my regiment. The man who remained with the guns of the battery when all others were gone was Corp'l James H. Lebroke. He is a most gallant, brave, and worthy of all praise. Respectfully,

ST. CLAIR A. MULHOLLAND,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.

Following is the communication of Corp'l Lebroke, published in a Philadelphia paper: HEADQUARTERS 5TH ME. BATTERY, CAMP NEAR WHITE OAK, CHANCELLORSVILLE, VA., May 27, 1863.

Who brought off the guns of the 5th Me. battery?

As this question has caused much discussion I thought I would let the friends of the battery know.

Strong, steady nerves

Are needed for success

Everywhere. Nerves

Depend simply, solely,

Upon the blood.

Pure, rich, nourishing

Blood feeds the nerves

And makes them strong.

The great nerve tonic is

Hood's Sarsaparilla,

Because it makes

The blood rich and

Pure, giving it power

To feed the nerves.

Hood's Sarsaparilla

Cures nervousness,

Dyspepsia, rheumatism,

Catarrh, scrofula,

And all forms of

Impure blood.

battery know through the columns of your paper to whom the honor is due. It has been stated that Lieut. Whittier deserves great credit for bringing off the guns after the horses were killed and wounded. Lieut. Whittier did not bring off the guns, neither was there the time after the battle that the battery had ceased firing one of the gunners went to Gen. Hancock for a detail to haul off the guns. He sent a detail from the Irish Brigade, under the command of Lieut. Col. Mulholland, with Lieut. Sacra, of the 116th Pa., and Lieut. Wilson, of Gen. Hancock's staff. The guns were hauled three miles by hand, and the brave men who exposed themselves to a severe fire of shot and shell from the rebel batteries to save our guns lost their own, the rebels having the ground immediately after. Lieut. Stevens has been in command of the battery since the battle.

I. H. LEPROKE,

Corp'l, 5th Me. battery.

—ROBT. G. SMITH,

Lieutenant, 2d Del., Newton, Pa.

THAT CANNON CHARGE.

Comrade Greenman Protests Against Recent Criticism of His Statements.

EDITOR NATIONAL TRIBUNE: In your issue of Jan. 13, I note the comment of Comrade Randall, 102d Ill., on the "cannon charge" at Resaca, Ga., May 15, 1864. I have in my possession letters from Gen. Daniel Butterfield and H. E. Treiman, in which the article was submitted before its publication. It seems preposterous for anyone to assume that a task of the nature of that achievement could be accomplished by any one brigade in that division or any other in that army, for that matter, with the enemy's strength of position so well known by our Generals commanding at that time.

In his reproduction of General Orders, No. 4, (of which I have a copy) the comrade omits that position which refers to the Third Brigade in that division, who fought so valiantly, repulsing the enemy, estimated to be twice their number, thereby enabling the First and Second Brigades to obtain and maintain the position they had gained by heroic fighting.

My regiment constituted a part of the Second Brigade, yet I can fully appreciate the fact that those brave and gallant soldiers in that Third Brigade must have put up a tremendous fight, to have stopped that determined onset, the success of which meant so much to the opposing force, and also to the result of that undertaking. Note the diagram of the formation of the Third Division in this historic charge, in columns of regiments en masse, advancing to the strongly entrenched position of the enemy, and also that of the Third Brigade, and it is not patent to the observer, with any knowledge of evolution, that the position of advantage gained by the First and Second Brigades could not have been maintained but for the brave, determined and tenacious opposition that the enemy met with in their onslaught against the soldiers of that command?

Had not the Third Brigade repulsed that assault against them, I repeat the First and Second Brigades would have been in as much of a hurry to get back to the point from which they started as the Johnnies were to get farther south when they found out that their position of that splendid assault by the Third Division, Twentieth Corps, had made their position no longer tenable.

I reiterate most emphatically that those cannon were not in our possession at the end of that afternoon's battle, and that the honor of that achievement belongs to no brigade, no regiment, but to the whole of that Third Division, Twentieth Corps.

Since writing that article I have seen and read a number of official reports in the War Records bearing on this subject, and find in them corroborations of my statement that the position of the troops on both sides after the assault was such that the cannon were beyond the possession of either side.

To make the fact more evident, I quote from the War Records a portion of the official report of Lieut. Col. Philo B. Buckingham, 20th Conn., who had charge of that detail on that memorable night when those cannon were recovered.

"With two companies from the 20th Conn., two from the 85th Ind., and two from the 19th Mich., we dug away the earth in front of the redoubt, and with ropes drew out the cannon."

Confed. Div. Genl. C. L. Stevenson.

Confed. Brigade.

Redoubt.

23 TENN. 45 TENN.

1st Brigade 2nd Brigade

3d Brigade 4th Brigade

5th Brigade 6th Brigade

7th Brigade 8th Brigade

9th Brigade 10th Brigade

11th Brigade 12th Brigade

13th Brigade 14th Brigade

15th Brigade 16th Brigade

17th Brigade 18th Brigade

19th Brigade 20th Brigade

21st Brigade 22nd Brigade

23rd Brigade 24th Brigade

25th Brigade 26th Brigade

27th Brigade 28th Brigade

29th Brigade 30th Brigade

31st Brigade 32nd Brigade

33rd Brigade 34th Brigade

35th Brigade 36th Brigade

37th Brigade 38th Brigade

39th Brigade 40th Brigade

41st Brigade 42nd Brigade

43rd Brigade 44th Brigade

45th Brigade 46th Brigade

47th Brigade 48th Brigade

49th Brigade 50th Brigade

51st Brigade 52nd Brigade

53rd Brigade 54th Brigade

55th Brigade 56th Brigade

57th Brigade 58th Brigade

59th Brigade 60th Brigade

61st Brigade 62nd Brigade

63rd Brigade 64th Brigade

65th Brigade 66th Brigade

67th Brigade 68th Brigade

69th Brigade 70th Brigade

71st Brigade 72nd Brigade

73rd Brigade 74th Brigade